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MINNESOTA LAWtV REV"IEIW
GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR TORTS IN
MINNESOTA*
By ORVILLE C. PETERSONt
lI. STATUTES PROVIDING FOR THE INDIRECT ASSUMPTION
OF LIABILITY
T HE ADVENT of the motor car has made strikingly manifest
the incongruity of holding municipalities responsible for torts
committed in one capacity while leaving them immune from
liability in another. It is difficult for a pedestrian whose skull is
fractured by a publicly-owned automobile operated negligently to
appreciate the fact that he has no recourse against the govern-
mental owner because the motor vehicle was being operated at the
time of the accident in a governmental capacity when he is told
that he might have recovered if he had been struck by the same
car or one like it the day before when it was operated in a
proprietary capacity. In many instances the pedestrian will
quickly discover that while he may sue the driver, the judgment
he will recover is quite an empty one.
Prompted by considerations such as this, many municipal cor-
porations and quasi corporations have tried to avoid the harsh-
ness of the immunity doctrine in such cases by paying the
premiums on insurance against the liability of their employees in
driving motor vehicles. The more cautious sought the consent
of the attorney general to such a scheme for the indirect assump-
tion of liability; but they were repeatedly told that the arrange-
ment would be unlawful because it would amount to a gift of
public funds, whether the liability insured against was that of
the officer or that of the municipal subdivision itself.Y44 An agency
*Continued from 26 -MINNESOTA LAW REvIEw 358, 480. 613 and 700.
Views expressed in this study are the author's and not those of the League ol
Minnesota Municipalities, with which he is associated.
tAttorney for the League of Minnesota Municipalities, Minneapoli,
'Minnesota.
94 Minn. Op. Atty. Gen. 1926. No. 218%, relating to cities, countits,
boards of education, and county sanatoriums: Minn. Op. Atty. Gen. 1928,
No. 85, dealing with liability insurance on automobiles of the county high-
way engineer; Minn. Opp. Atty. Gen. 1926, No. 160. insurance on school
buses: Minn. Op. Atty. Gen. 19,30, No. 47, public buildings of municipal
corporations.
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of the state, the University, met with the same response." *' The
answers of attorneys general of other states to similar questions
usually have also been in the negative." 6
Since the injustices resulting from the non-liability of munici-
pal corporations for the negligence of their officers and employees
in the performance of governmental functions were most apparent
when the injury occurred through the negligent operation of a
motor vehicle, it is not surprising that this situation received
legislative attention first. In 1929 a general law was passed to
permit the indemnification of police and fire department employees
against loss or expense from torts of this character.0" A 1935
amendment extended the scope of the law to cover other political
subdivisions besides municipal corporations, but limited the powers
granted to the carrying of insurance and the defense of suits
against employees."' The law now reads:
"That all towns school districts " 49 having an assessed valua-
tiorf of over $2,000,0000 and cities, villages and boroughs in this
state are hereby authorized to carry insurance against liability of
employees of any departments thereof by reason of claims for
bodily injuries, death or property damage made upon any such
employee by reason of his operation of a motor vehicle while
in the performance of his duties, and to defend in the name and
on behalf of such employee any suit brought against him to
enforce a claim, whether groundless or not, arising out of the
operation of a motor vehicle by him while in the performance of
his duties."
A second section authorizes the governing body to pay the
premiums on insurance policies "insuring individuals or groups of
the employees referred to in sec. I hereof against liability for
injury to person or property, within the limitations of sec. I
hereof." Such payment of insurance premiums "shall in no way
impose upon any municipality any liability whatever."9 5'5
Two years later the same principle was extended to counties,
945Minn. Op. Atty. Gen. 1930, No. 341.9461Many of the citations to such opinions dealing with liability insur-
ance on school buses are collected in Borchard, Recent Statutory Develop-
ments in Municipal Liability in Tort, (1936) 2 Legal Notes oi Local
Government 89, 97 at footnotes 65, 66.947Minnesota, Laws 1929, ch. 81.94SMinnesota, Laws 1935. ch. 338, found in 3 Mason's 1927 .Min. Stat..
1940 Supp., sec. 1920-1.949The absence of a comma between "towns" and "school districts" is a
defect of the original act.9501t is not apparent from the act whether or not the assessed valua-
tion minimum applies to towns as well as school districts. It probably
wras intended so to apply.9
-
5 Other acts have permitted the county sheriff of certain counties to
carry liability insurance on automobiles under his control. See. for example,
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but the authority granted, like that of the original 1929 law, in-
cluded that of paying and compromising claims without suit in
addition to insuring against them and defending suits arising
out of them."5  In 1935 similar acts were passed for county school
districts of less than 10,000 population" 3 and for the University
of Minnesota."" The fact that these three acts all legalize pay-
ments made before their passage suggests that the practice of
insuring public officers and employees against liability in the
operation of motor vehicles in the performance of official duties
had already become established.
Another act. almost identical in wording, extended the same
authority to cities, villages and boroughs in connection with the
operation of motor vehicles by police and fire department em-
ployees." ' The fact that this law applies only to "employees"
while the other comparable acts speak of "officers and employees"
may or may not be significant. If the term is used in its strict
sense in contrast to "officer." the application of the act must be
confined within narrow limits, particularly in the case of police
departments, since policemen, who would drive most police de-
partment automobiles, have been held in at least one situation to
Minnesota, Laws 1929. ch. 136, Laws 1931, ch. 313. and Laws 1939. ch. 358.
fixing amounts to be allowed the sheriff of Ramsey County for such things
as "the . . . upkeep of automobiles, and insurance, including liability and
property damage covering the operator of the automobiles .. "
95 2Minnesota, Laws 1931. ch. 330. found in 3 Mason's 1927 Ntinn. Stats..
1940 Supp., secs. 672-1 to 672-3. Section 1 of the act, which has served as a
model for at least three acts passed since 1931, reads, "The county boards of
all counties in this state are hereby authorized to indemnify their officers
and employees for loss or expense arising or resulting from claims for
bodily injuries, death or property damage made upon such officers or
employees by reason of their operation of motor vehicles while in the
performance of their official duties, and to defend, in the names of and ()In
behalf of such officers and employees, any suits brought against themn to
enforce claims, whether groundless or not, arising out of their operation of
motor vehicles under such circumstances, and to compromise and settle
any such claims or suits and to pay the amount of such settlements or
compromises or the amount of any judgments rendered against such officers
or employees on any such claims without first requiring such officers or
employees to pay the same." Section 2 is similar to the second %ection
of the 1929 act quoted in the text.
95 Minnesota. Laws 1935. ch. 15. found in 3 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats..
1940 Suipp.. secs. 2780-17b. c. d. Only Lake County has such a school
district.
15.%*innesota. Laws 1935. ch. 173, 3 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats.. 19,10
Stpp., sees. 3139-3, 4. 5.
9.5Minnesota. Laws 1937, ch. 149. 3 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats.. 1940
Supp.. sec. 1933-67. This was virtually a reenactment of Ml innesota, l,ass
1929, ch. 81 and was evidently intended to reinstate the authority lost by
cities and villages when Laws of 1929, ch. 81 was amended by Laws 193,1.
ch. 338. See (1937) 22 Minnesota Municipalities 214.
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be officers. 95 6 Probably the term should be given a broader con-
struction.
The last of this series of acts957 permits any school board to
"provide for the protection of school children in its respective
district, being transported for all school purposes or activities in
district owned, operated, leased or controlled motor vehicles,
against injuries or damages arising out of the operation thereof."
The board is authorized to procure insurance to get this protec-
tion, but like similar laws the statute specifically adds that the
payment of any insurance premiums imposes no liability on the
school district 5s s
None of these acts has yet been construed by the courts, so
the interpretation that the judiciary will place upon them is still
doubtful. Evidently it has not been the intent of any of the laws
to change any of the rules of liability of the officers of the
government to the persons injured. 9
The act permitting school boards to protect school children
from damages arising out of the operation of school buses carries
a specific provision that any insurance contract negotiated for
this purpose should include a clause "expressly waiving the de-
fense, by the insurer, that the school district is engaged in a
governmental function. 960 The effect of such a clause had been
determined by the supreme court three years before in Howard
v. Village of Chishlm.9 6' Since the injury for which recompense
was sought in that case occurred during a hockey game, the court
pointed out that the city could have defended successfully on the
ground that it owned and maintained the recreational building
in its governmental capacity for the health and recreation of its
956State ex rel. Egan v. Schram, (1901) 82 Minn. 420, 85 N. W. 155.
957Mnnesota, Laws 1937, ch. 301, 3 Mason's 1927 .Minn. Stats., 1940
Supp, secs. 2816-8, 9.
955The latter provision is in sec. 2 of the act. Cf. Laws 1933, ch. 23.
3 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., 1940 Supp., secs. 2883-3 to 2883-5, authorizing
the formation of school safety patrols. Section 3 of that act specifically
provides that no liability should attach to the district or to any officer or
employee of the district because of injuries sustained by reason of the
operation of the school patrol.
959See Tooke, The Extension of Municipal Liability in Tort. (1932)
19 Va. L. Rev. 97, 110; Minn. Op. Atty. Gen. 1932. No. 61 holding that
the law does not authorize the county to purchase liability insurance to
protect the county itself from such claims; Minn. Op. Alty. Gen. 1934. No.
94: "The statute in no way changes or modifies the rules of law with
reference to liability, of villages in operating automobiles in responding to
fire calls. This would be done in its governmental capacity and for negli-
gence in its operation, the village is not liable."
9603 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., 1940 Supp.. sec. 2816-8.
961(1934) 191 Minn. 245. 253 N. W. 766.
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inhabitants.-6 2 However, the plaintiff pleaded that the defendant
had procured insurance against injuries from the operation of
the community building and in the policy the insurer had agreed
not to defend on the ground that the building was used for
governmental functions. The effect of the provision seemed too
clear for argument, for the court merely said that since the
defendant was to be liable if a private person would be in the
same circumstances, the verdict was clearly justifiable, there being
ample evidence of negligence. The insurance in this case was
not permitted by statute and involved an unauthorized expenditure
of public funds if the attorney general's opinions are to be con-
sidered as correct. The case may probably be considered as
authority for the proposition that the lack of municipal power to
execute the insurance policy is not available as a defense to the
insurance company.
This series of statutes may be extremely significant, because
it may indicate the way in which the immunity of governments
for their torts will be. broken down by legislation. Since the
municipality can act only through its agents, the device of under-
writing the officer or employee's liability might be extended to give
relief in most cases of misfeasance where the officer or employee
is himself liable. Furthermore, the decision in Howard v. Village
of Chishohn leaves the way open for a legislative enactment which,
following the precedent established by the school bus insurance
law,963 would permit the carrying of insurance against any public
tort liability, the insurer waiving the defense of governmental
immunity and thus in effect creating responsibility where none
existed before.9 4 At present, however, not only is statutory exten-
sion of liabilit-y confined to insurance against motor vehicle tort.q,
and indemnification of officers and employees in such cases, but
even in that field, the new authority is given on a purely optional
basis. In case the municipality chooses not to indemnify the
officer or employee or to carry insurance against loss clue to his
06 2The court cited Emmons v. City of Virginia, (1922) 152 Minn.
295, 188 N. W. 561, 29 A. L. R. 860.96 3 Minnesota, Laws 1937, ch. 301, 3 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats.. 1940
Supp., secs. 2816-8, 9.
964It has been held elsewhere that the presence of insurance gives the
plaintiff a right to recover where his right would have been barred in its
absence. Rogers v. Butler, (1936) 170 Tenn. 125. 92 S. W. (2d) 414
(insurance against liability) a contrary case involving insurance against
loss is Simons v. Gregory, (1905) 120 Ky. 116, 85 S. W. 751. The situa-
tion is closely analogous to one where a charity, itself not liable for its
torts, enters into a contract of insurance against liability. Consult on this
point a recent case comment in (1940) 24 MINNESOTA Law REi'v:w 696.
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motor vehicle torts, an injured person still has no recourse except
against the officer or employee, who is in many cases financially
irresponsible.9 65
In one limited field, that of false arrest by a police officer, a
statutory provision has made mandatory the assumption of some
responsibility by the municipality. Any city, - village, borough.
township or county employing a police officere"O is required under
a 1937 law967 to furnish competent legal counsel to defend the
officer against actions to recover damages for alleged false arrest
"when such alleged false arrest was made by such officer in good
faith and in the performance of his official duties." It must also
pay reasonable costs and expenses of the defense, including wit-
ness and counsel fees, notwithstanding contrary provisions in laws
or charters. It is authorized to pay the amount of any judgment
rendered against the officer "if, in the discretion of the governing
.body . . ., it seems fitting and proper to do so." If judgment is
entered for the officer, the judgment for costs and disbursements
is assigned to the municipality employing him. Statutory authority
to pay counsel fees in such actions was not necessary, since the
court had held a number of years earlier that in the absence of
charter prohibition, a municipality could employ attorneys to
defend its officers against false arrest and imprisonment when the
arrest was made in good faith.96
N. HOME RULE CHARTER PROVISIONS?"s
1. LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY
The established principle that a legislature may impose or
withhold liability for torts of the state or its subdivisions has been
965in some states legislation has gone further through the adoption
of the Operators' and Chauffeurs' Licenses Act, part of the Uniform 'Motor
Vehicle Code. Some ten states appear to have adopted sec. 24. which pro-
vides: "This state, and every county, city, municipal or other public
corporation Within this state employing any operator or chauffeur shall
be jointly and severally liable with such operator or chauffeur for any
damages caused by the negligence of the latter while driving a imotor
vehicle upon a highway in the course of his employmenL" See Borchard.
Recent Statutory Developments in Municipal Liability in Tort. (1936) 2
Legal Notes on Local Government. 89. 94; Note. Municipal Liability for
Mxotor Vehicle Torts, (1935) 10 Temple L. Q. 75, in which the Pennsyl-
vania law is reviewed.
9G6Sheriffs are included..
967'%finnesota, Laws 1937, ch. 442, 3 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats.. 1940
Supp., secs. 1933-81, 82.
96sCity of M1oorhead v. Murphy. (1905) 94 Minn. 123. 102 N. W. 219.
969This analysis of charter provisions covers all the 76 home rule
charters in the state. Of these 71 are available in the library of the Munici-
pal Reference Bureau and the League of ,Minnesota Municipalities at the
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applied in this state to home rule charters, 70 under which seventy-
six of the cities of the state now operateY7 ' As might be expected,
most of the present charters contain some provision on the subject
of tort liability,"7 2 but considering the wide range for experimenta-
tion, the charters manifest little inclination to develop new fron-
tiers. Provisions on tort liability are of a few general types,
obviously taken over for the most part word for word from
neighboring charters already in effect. No provision has attempted
to enlarge liability of the city for its torts; sections have been
drawn rather to limit the common law liability of the city or to
see that the responsibility for a tortious act in which the municipal
corporation did not actively participate falls on the person whose
negligence caused the injury.
Of the provisions limiting the city's liability, the most sweep-
ing was upheld by the court in Schigley v. City of Vaseca,979 in
which the principle was established that the conditions tinder
which liability may be imposed upon a city for damages resulting
from the unsafe condition of its streets is an appropriate subject
for inclusion in a home rule charter. The provision sustained in
that case was one which, as a condition precedent to municipal
liability for an accident, required ten days' written notice of the
existence of a defect before the accident occurred. Such a clause
absolutely eliminates the rule as to constructive notice and, so far
as liability is concerned, it also eliminates the requirement of
inspection by municipal officials to keep them informed of defects.
While no figures are available on the effect of such provisions on
the number of claims which the city is required to pay. it is
obvious that such a provision must cut cases in which liability
can be established to a mere fraction of the number that would
otherwise occur. As a matter of fact, except in a city with an
inexcusably inefficient street department, a condition precedent
to suit of written notice of the defect ten days in advance of the
injury virtually abolishes the city's liability in street defect cases.
University of Minnesota. Access to the other five has been ohtained through
the state law library and the offices of the attorney general and secretary
of state. Except where otherwise indicated, the reference is to the original
charter. Some of the provisions may have been supplanted, however, by
later amendments which do not appear in the collection at the University.
970Schigley v. City of Waseca, (1908) 106 Minn. 94, 118 N. W. 259.
971(1939) Minnesota Year Book 145. New Ulm, Biwahik anl Gilbert
have been added to the list since the 1939 Year "Book was published.9 720nly four seem to omit mention of the subject. Fly (1903), Fair-
mont (1927), Hastings (1907). and South St. Paul (105) are in this
group.
473(1908) 106 Minn. 94. 118 N. W. 259.
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Yet the inclusion of a written notice provision in a charater is
comparatively unusual. Only eight present home rule charters
contain a condition as comprehensive as the Waseca clause in-
volved in the Schigley Case.9 4
A somewhat larger number of cities have imposed less drastic
conditions of the Waseca type in their charter. At least twelve
provide that in actions for personal injuries (not property dam-
age) resulting from defects in streets, bridges, culverts, or public
utilities, the plaintiff must prove that the want of repair existed
for ten days or that !he city had actual notice and knowledge of
the defective conditionY" In one of these cases, Faribault, written
notice must be made five days before the accident if the defect
has not existed for ten days. Waseca requires that in any action
for damages based on an alleged sidewalk defect, the plaintiff
must prove that the defect existed for more than thirty days prior
to the injury or that the city had actual notice or knowledge for
ten days before the accident.97
A second type of charter provision limiting liability is a notice
of claim provision, found in almost every charter.9 " Many of
974Biwabik (1941) sec. 67; Gilbert (1941) sec. 67; Glencoe (1909) ch.
IX, sec. 7; Lake City (1909) ch. 14, sec. 6; Madison (1923) sec. 101;
Northfield (1907) ch. IX, sec. 7, as amended in 1924; Warren (1941)
sec. 165; Waseca (1904) ch. VII, sec. 7. All these provisions require 10
days' notice except that of Warren which prescribes actual notice of 48
hours.975Anoka (1929) ch. XVI, sec. 2; Eveleth (1913) sec. 214; Faribault
(1911) sec. 272; Glenwood (1937) sec. 108; Granite Falls (1936) sec. 113;
Jackson (1920) sec. 241; Lake Crystal (1912) sec. 225; Mankato (1911)
sec. 225; Pipestone (1913) sec. 222; St. James (1918) sec. 236; Sleepy
Eye (1903) ch. VIII, sec. 13; Tracy (1933) sec. 102.976
'Waseca (1904) ch. VII, sec. 6.
977Ada (1908) sec. 213; Albert Lea (1927) sec. 104; Alexandria (1909)
sec. 176; Anoka (1929) Ch. XVI, sec. 1; Austin (1903) ch. VII, sec. 14:
Barnesville (1898) ch. XIV, sec. 13; Bemidji (1905) ch. X, sec. 20;
Benson (1908) ch. XIV, sec. 16; Blue Earth (1899) ch. IV, sec. 60;
Breckenridge (1907) sec. 212; Brainerd (1908) sec. 94; Cannon Falls
(1905) ch. XIV, sec. 14; Chisholm (1934) sec. 237; Columbia Heights
(1921) sec. 112; Crookston (1906) sec. 110; Dawson (1911) ci. 19.
sec. 5; Detroit Lawes (1903) sec. 203; Duluth (1913) sec. 103; Eveleth(1913) sec. 213; Faribault (1911) sec. 271; Fergus Falls (1903) sec. 206:
Fraser (1932) sec. 62; Glenwood (1937) sec. 107; Granite Falls (1936)
sec. 113; Hutchinson (1913) ch. X, sec. 7; International Falls (1910) ch.
XVIII, sec. 7; Jackson (1920) sec. 240; Lake City (1909) ch. 14, sec. 6;
Lake Crystal (1912) sec. 224; Little Falls (1920) sec. 100; Madison (1923)
sec. 101; Mankato (1911) sec. 224; Minneapolis (1920) ci. VIII. sec. 19:
Minnetonka Beach (1922) art. V, sec. 1; Montevideo sec. 107; Moor-
head (1900) sec. 212; Morris (1913) sec. 107; New Uhn (1940) sec. 99.
100; Northfield (1907) ch. IX. sec. 7 as amended in 192-4: Ortonville
(1927) sec. 196; Owatonna (1909) chi. VI, sec. 6; Pipestone (1913) sec.
221; Red Wing (1902) ch. XVIII, sec. 4; Redwood Falls (1941) sec. 102:
Renville (1906) ch. IX, sec. 7; Robbinsdale (1938) sec. 93; Rochester
(1904) sec. 185; Rushford (1927) sec. 64; St. Cloud (1911) sec. 207;
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these provisions are much like the statute requiring notice of tort
claims, some making variations in the time when notice must be
submitted or suit commenced and others applying only to actions
for damages due to defects."' These are doubtless now quite
ineffective in view of the holdings that the state law has super-
seded inconsistent charter provisions."' Others, notably those
attempting to extend the notice requirement to other actions than
those covered by the state law, may be in a different category. A
number, for example, apply the notice requirement to "any action
...on account of injuries or damages to persons or property, '"5 80
apparently attempting to make the notice a prerequisite in nuisance,
trespass, assault and battery, and other tort actions where the state
law requiring notice is inapplicable 8 1 It is arguable that such
provisions are valid since they are supplementary to, rather than
inconsistent with, the state law; but one decision indicates, some-
what unconvincingly, that the whole field has been taken over by
the notice statute to the complete exclusion of home rule charter
provisions. 82
St. James (1918) sec. 235; St. Paul (1914) sec. 184; Sauk Centre (1918)
sec. 114; Sleepy Eye (1903) ch. VIII, sec. 12; Springfield (1924) sec. 110:
Staples (1908) sec. 208; Stillwater (1915) sec. 371; Tower (1928) sec.
70; Tracy (1933) sec. 101; Two Harbors (1907) ch. XVIII, sec. 7:
Virginia (1909) sec. 321; Wabasha (1920) sec. 110; Warren (1941) sec.
166; Waseca (1904) ch. VII, sec. 5; Wayzata (1928) see. 69; White
Bear Lake (1922) sec. 144: Willmar (1901) sec. 209; Windom (1920) sec.
207; Winthrop (1907) ch. 13, sec. 14; Worthington (1909) sec. 195.
97 The latter group correspond to the effective portion of the 1897
statute. See note 778, (1942) 26 MINNFESOTA LAw RFivw 701.
.:'See (1942) 26 MINNESOTA LAw REvIEw 702.
9S0Albert Lea, Columbia Heights. Duluth, Fraser. Little Falls. Madi-
son. Minnetonka Beach. Montevideo. Morris, Robbinsdale. Rusliford. Sauk
Centre, Springfield. Stillwater. Tower, Vabasha. Wayzata. Vhite Bear
Lake. Citations appear in note 979 above. A similar provision is included
as sec. 105 of the model charter given in Professor W\illiam Anderson's
City Charter Making in Minnesota (1922) 146. Austin's provision covers
"injuries ... by any other means" in addition to injuries from defects.
By some curious reasoning. Duluth's provision, closely similar to most of
the others cited in this note, has been held inapplicable to actions for such
damages as those due to a change of grade. Johnson v. City of Duluth.(1916) 133 Minn. 405, 158 N. V. 616.
."siSee (1942) 26 MINNESOTA ALaw REVIEw 703-709.98 Johnson v. City of Duluth. (1916) 133 Minn. 405. 158 N. \V. 616. The
court said. p. 408. "There can be no doubt that the legislature intended to
establish a uniform rule which should apply to all municipalities, thus avoid-
ing the confusion arising out of the many dissimilar provision,; contained in
their various charters." The court purported to follow the rule of Nicol v.
City of St. Paul, (1900) 80 Minn. 415, 83 N. V. 375. that if it is cleat
that the statute includes and p~rovides for all of the objects sought to he
secured by the former, and is intended as the only rule which should govern
in the case provided for, the statute alone goveris. It is doubtful, however.
whether any such test should have resulted in invalidating those portiong
of a charter provision relating to claims for property danage inot due
to negligence or defects.
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I
If it is assumed that there is still room for valid home rule char-
ter provisions of this kind, another difficult question arises with
respect to the numerous charter provisions exempting persons
"berefit of reason" by the injury, or liberalizing the time limit for
notice or suit in such cases. " A dictum in one case9 s5 implied that
such an exception in a charter provision is effective; but the case
cannot be considered as a strong precedent because the relationship
between the state law and the charter provision on notice was not
mentioned, much less discussed.
A third class of charter provision is one confining liability
for street defects to graded streets,"' to streets graded and
opened for travel,98s or to streets "opened, used and traveled by
the public as a street or high ',ay.1 98 7 Several charters have similar
provisions specifying that the acceptance of a plat imposes no
liability to grade the streets covered by the plat or responsibility
for any insufficiency of such streets unless they are graded and
opened for, travel.9"" Since there may sometimes be liability for
983Ada, Alexandria, Austin, Barnesville, Bemidji, Benson, Blue Earth.
Brainerd, Breckenridge, Cannon Falls, Chisholm, Crookston, Dawson.
Detroit Lakes, Duluth, Eveleth, Faribault, Fergus Falls, Glenwood, Granite
Falls, Hutchinson, International Falls, Jackson, Lake City, Lake Crystal.
Little Falls, Mankato, Minneapolis, Morris, Ortonville, Owatonna. Pipe-
stone, Red Wing, Renville, Rochester, St. Cloud, St. James, Sauk Centre.
Staples, Stillwater, Two Harbors, Virginia, AVabasha, Willmar, WNindom.
Winthrop, Worthington. Citations are given in note 977. supra.984Szroka v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., (1927) 171 Minn. 57.
213 N. W. 557.985BIue Earth (1899) ch. IV, sec. 60; Brainerd (1908) sec. 94; Cannon
Falls (1905) ch. VIII, sec. 7; Crookston (1906) sec. 110; Dawson (1911)
ch. 11, sec. 7, ch. 19, sec. 5; Hutchinson (1913) ci. X, sec. 7; Lake City
(1909) ch. 14, sec. 6; "Minneapolis ci. VIII, sec. 19; Ortonville (1928)
sec. 128; Red Wing (1902) ch. XVII, sec. 3; Renville (1906) ci. IX.
sec. 7; Winthrop (1907) ch. 8, sec. 7.
9s6 Austin (1903) ch. VII, sec. 14; Barnesville (1898) ch. XIV. see.
13; Benson (1908) ch. VII, sec 8; Owatonna (1909) c. VI. sec. 6:
Rochester (1902) sec. 185; St. Cloud (1911) sec. 207. These provisions also
deny liability for an insufficiency of ground where sidewalks usually are
built when no sidewalk has been constructed. In Graham v. City of Albert
Lea, (1892) 48 Minn. 201, 50 N. V. 1108, the city sought to escape liability
under such a clause, but the court found that a sidewalk had actually been
built.987Eveleth (1913) sec. 213; Faribault (1911) sec. 271; Granite Falls
(1936) sec. 113; Lake Crystal (1912) sec. 224; Mankato (1911) sec. 224:
Pipestone (1913) sec. 221; St. James (1918) sec. 235; Sleepy Eye (1903)
ch. VIII, sec. 12; Tracy (1933) sec. 101.98SAustin (1903) ch. VII, sec. 13; Bemidji (1905) ci. VIII, sec. IS;
Brainerd (1908) sec. 96; Crookston (1906) sec. 112; Glencoe (1909) ci.
IX, sec. 9; Hutchinson (1913) ch. X, sec. 9; Minneapolis (1920) ci. VIII,
sec. 23; New Ulm (1940) sec. 101; Northfield (1907) ci. IX, sec. 9:
Redwood Falls (1941) sec. 104; Renville (1906) ci. IX. sec. 9; Rochester
(1902) sec. 188; St. Cloud (1911) sec. 208; Stillwater (1915) sec. 315:
Tracy (1933) sec. 104; Warren (1941) sec. 168; Winthrop (1907) cli. 8.
sec. 9.
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defects in an ungraded street,95s such clauses may operate to some
extent as a limitation on liability that might otherwise exist.
A more significant limitation of liability is found in the Lake
City and Red Wing charters which make the city immune from
legal responsibility in snow and ice cases. 90 The Red Wing pro-
vision, copied in the Lake City charter, reads:
"No action shall be maintained against the City of Red Ating,
for the recovery of any damages to persons or property on account
of any injuries received or caused by reason of the deposit, ac-
cumulation, or condition of any snow or ice, upon any street,
sidewalk, lane, alley or public grounds within said city."
No other charter except Lake City's has followed Red Wing's
lead, although the charter of that city, one of the oldest in the
state, has been in existence for almost forty years. However, such
a provision would be of little practical effect in charters which
require written notice of street and sidewalk defects in advance of
accidents on which claims are based.
2. EXTENSIONS OF LIABILITY OF THIRD PERSONS
Home rule charters almost uniformly impose liability for dam-
ages resulting from street obstructions and excavations upon those
persons who are responsible for them or fail to barricade them or
otherwise warn against them.99 To this extent, probably no
liability is added to that existing without legislative provision.9 2
9S9Miller v. City of Duluth, (1916) 134 Minn. 418, 159 N. W. 960. See
also (1942) 26 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 488.
990Lake City (1909) ch. 14, sec. 3; Red Wing (1902) ch. XVII, sec, 3.99 1Ada (1908) sec. 214; Albert Lea (1927) sec. 105; Alexandria
(1927) sec. 178: Bemidji (1905) ch. VIII, sec. 10; Benson (1908) ch.
VIII. sec. 8: Biwabik (1941) sec. 67; Breckenridge (1907) sec. 214;
Brainerd (1908) sec. 92: Cannon Falls (1905) ch. VIII, sec. 6; Chisholm
(1934) sec. 248; Columbia Heights (1921) sec. 113; Crookston (1906) sec.
108: Dawson (1911) ch. 11. sec. 6; Detroit Lakes (1903) sec. 205; Duluth
(1913) sec. 105; Eveleth (1913) sec. 215; Fergus Falls (1903) see. 208;
Gilbert (1941) sec. 67; Glencoe (1909) ch. IX, sec. 6; Glenwood (1937)
sec. 109. 110; Granite Falls (1936) sec. 115. 116; Hutchinson (1913) ch.
X, sec. 6; International Falls (1910) ch. XVIII, sec. 18; Jackson (1920)
sec. 238; Lake City (1909) ch. 14, sec. 1. 4; Little Falls (1920) sec. 103;
Madison (1923) sec. 102; Minneapolis (1920) ch. VIII, sec. 17; Montevideo
(1930) sec. 108; Moorhead (1900) sec. 214; New Ulm (1940) sec. 98:
Northfield (1907) ch. IX. sec. 6: Ortonville (1927) sec. 127; Pipestone
(1913) sec. 219; Red Wing (1902) ch. XVII, sec. 1; Redwood Falls
(1941) sec. 101; Renville (1906) ch. IX, sec. 6; Robbinsdale (1938) sec.
94; Rushford (1927) sec. 66; St. Cloud (1911) sec. 205; St. James (1918)
sec. 233; Sauk Centre (1918) sec. 115; Springfield (1924) sec. 111;
Staples (1908) sec. 210; Stillwater (1915) sec. 371 ; Tower (1928) sec. 71 ;
Tracy (1933) sec. 100: Two Harbors (1907) ch. XVIII, sec. 18; Virginia
(1909) sec. 332; Wabasha (1920) sec. 111; Warren (1941) sec. 167;
Wayzata (1928) sec. 70; Willmar (1901) sec. 211; Windom (1920) sec.
209; Winthrop (1907) ch. 8. sec. 6: Worthington (1909) sec. 197.
9 2See (1942) 26 M.%,INNESOTA LAW REVIE W 527 ff.
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In addition, however, these sections frequently add a requirement
that the individual tort feasor be joined as defendant if the city
is sued for damages resulting from the defect.0 " Several cases
have involved procedural aspects of such provisions.° 91 It has
been held that under a provision requiring joinder of the obstructer
of the streets with the city, a verdict may, if the evidence justifies
it, be against both defendants or against one and in favor of the
other; and in case the verdict is against the city and in favor of
the co-defendant, the city cannot move for a new trial on the
ground that the verdict ought to have been against the co-defend-
ant also, unless the latter is made a party to the motion.935 If the
person causing the defective condition of the street is not joined
as the charter requires, the city must raise the objection by
demurrer, if the facts on which it is based appear in the complaint,
or by answer. If it raises the objection in its answer, it must name
the person who should be joined as the defendant, and the proof
must sustain the plea of non-joindero 9 The mode of procedure
provided by the charter in such cases is not exclusive. Instead of
waiting for an action against it, the city may pay damages without
suit, and then recover the amount paid in an, action against the
person responsible 97
Another less common type of charter provision is one attempt-
ing to shift to the abutting landowner the municipal corporation's
duty to keep sidewalks in safe condition. An old city charter of
Stillwatere 9s contained a provision of this kind, making it the
duty of all landowners to construct and keep in repair the side-
walks abutting their lots. It also provided that they should be
liable for all damages resulting from their negligence in not
keeping the sidewalk in good repair, that the landowner had to be
joined with the city as defendant and in case of judgment execu-
tion had to issue against the landowner first. However, the
provision was held unconstitutional. 990 The court said the liability
was in the nature of a penalty to enforce performance of a duty
imposed as a tax, just as a direct pecuniary penalty is very gen-
993Bemidji, Brainerd, Crookston, Dawson, Eveleth, Glencoe. Glenwood.
Hutchinson, Jackson, Lake City, Minneapolis, New Uln. Northfield. Orton-
yle, Pipestone, Red Wing. Redwood Falls, Renville, St. Cloud. St. James,
Winthrop. Citations appear in note 991 above.994The cases referred to deal with provisions of special laws; but
doubtless they apply to charter provisions as well.995Clark v. City of Austin, (1888) 38 Minn. 487, 38 N. WN\. 615.
996Jones v. City of Minneapolis, (1883) 31 Minn. 230. 17 N. W. 377.
997City of Wabasha v. Southworth, (1893) 54 Minn. 79, 55 N. W. 818.
99SMinnesota, Sp. -L. 1881, ch. 92, subch. 8, sec. 13.99
-
9Noonan v. City of Stillwater, (1885) 33 Minn. 198, 22 N. W. 444.
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erally provided to enforce payment of necessary assessments for
local improvements. Since the penalty was but an incident of the
tax, it was subject to the same qualifications: it had to be uniform
and enforcement had to be limited to the particular property. The
court continued :1000
"The liability provided in the charter is one which subjects tile
owner to a personal action, and it cannot be sustained. The duty
to construct and maintain sidewalks, being in the nature of a tax,
is one that is owing only to the city, just as the duty to pay taxes
for local improvements imposed in any other way. It is not and
from its very nature cannot be, a duty owing to third persons. In
this respect it differs from certain police regulations intended for
the protection of each one of the public, such as laws regulating
the speed of railroad trains, prohibiting fast driving of horses in
the streets and the like. Now, whether it is competent for the legis-
lature to make one liable to private persons for failure in the duty
to pay taxes of any kind to the state or municipal corporations.
is a very grave question."
Two of the five justices concurred on the ground that this was
an attempt to shift upon the property owner-a private person-
a liability for the failure of the public authorities to perform a
governmental duty'.
Since the case of Noonan v. City of Stillwater antedated the
constitutional enabling authority for the adoption of home rule
charters, the invalidity of such provisions made it appear useless
to charter drafters to include similar provisions in home rule
charters; consequently, none of the existing charters appears to
go beyond the imposition of the cost of sidewalk construction and
repair upon abutting property owners. 001 Of course, if the abutting
owner digs a hole or creates an obstruction on the sidewalk in
front of his property, he, like others doing the same act, might be
subject to a suit as co-defendant with the city under the charter
provisions previously discussed.
A third type of charter provision imposing obligations on
third persons in connection with acts for which the city is liable
now appears to be largely unimportant. A section frequently has
been included in charters placing upon railroads and street railway
companies liability for damages resulting from their piling snow,
1000(1885) 33 Minn. 198, 205, 22 N. W. 444.
001 The Warren charter of 1914 at ch. 12, sec. 22. contained a provi-
sion making the owner liable when a pedestrian was injured because of a
defect in a sidewalk; but this provision appears to have been drop ed
from the 1941 revision. There may have been similar proviions in ot ier
charters now superseded.
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in clearing their tracks, on the traveled portion of the roadway.""0°
Since there have been no cases construing charter sections of this
kind, it is difficult to appraise their effect; but it is doubtful
whether they change the law in any material degree, since one
causing a street defect is liable for the damages resulting from it.
Perhaps it is a fact worth comment that the charters which
have any one type of charter provision, other than the notice of
claims section and the provision requiring the person creating an
unsafe condition in the street to answer in damages for the con-
sequences, usually have the other types of provisions which
have commonly appeared; and in most cases these are found
in the older charters. Most of the newer charters display a notice-
able tendency throughout toward brevity and the elimination of
a great many provisions which used to appear in charters as
regularly as sections like that on powers of the council; and
this recent trend is no less evident in the sections on tort liability
than elsewhere. The charters since 1920, with only a few exceptions,
usually have contained but two provisions in this respect; one re-
quiring notice of claims before the commencement of every tort
action, and another making the person causing a street excava-
tion or obstruction liable to the city or to third persons for dam-
ages resulting from it.1003 The Waseca provision, or modifications
of it, have been included in only two or three recent charters.
0. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGArNST TAKING OR
DAMAGING PROPERTY FOR PUBLIC USE WITHOUT COMPENSATION
In Minnesota, as in practically all states '004 the constitution
contains a safeguard against the abuse of the governmental power
to acquire property for public use. Minnesota's provision' is
couched in these words:
10O2Bemidji (1905) ch. VIII, sec. 12; Benson (1908) ch. VIII, see.
10; Brainerd (1908) sec. 95; Cannon Falls (1905) ch. VIII, sec. 8;
Crookston (1906) sec. 111; Dawson (1911) ch. 11, sec. 8; Glencoe (1909)
ch. IX, sec. 8; Hutchinson (1913) ch. X, sec. 8; International Falls (1910)
ch. VII, sec. 44; Lake City (1909) ch. 14, sec. 7; Minneapolis (1920) ch.
VIII, sec. 20; Northfield (1907) ch. IX, sec. 8; Ortonville (1928) sec.
129; Red Wing (1902) ch. XVII, sec. 5; Renville (1906) ch. IX, see. 8:
Warren (1914) ch. XII, sec. 8; Winthrop (1907) ch. 8, sec. 8.
2003In this respect, as in many others, the charter makers have either
consciously or unconsciously followed Professor Anderson's Model Charter.
published in 1922 as part of his monograph on City Charter .Making in
Minnesota.004Eve, as early as 1909, only one state, North Carolina, could be
listed as an exception. Lewis, Eminent Domain, (3rd ed. 1909) sec. 11.
'EMinnesota constitution, art. 1, sec. 13.
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"Private property shall not be taken, destroyed or damaged
for public use, without just compensation therefor first paid or
secured."
Originally, the constitutional prohibition extended only to
the taking of property. The words "destroyed or damaged" were
not inserted until 1896.2
This study is not concerned, of course, with the regular exer-
cise under the statutes3 of the power of eminent domain, since
such action cannot be considered tortious; but the taking or
damaging of property for public use, without exercising that
power, may be considered tortious under the constitution.'
Prior to the amendment of 1896 it was held that the munici-
pal corporation was not liable for consequential damages neces-
sarily suffered through the establishment of a street grade."
Changes in grade were treated in the same manner as original
grades in this respect.6 The hardship of this rule led to the amend-
ment of 1896 ;7 and since that time. damages suffered by a prop-
erty owner from the establishment of a street grade have been
compensable s The rule has been applied also to a change in the
original established grade? Recoverable damages include damages
2The amendment was proposed by Laws 1895. ch. 5 and was ratified by
the voters on November 3. 1896.
31 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats.. ch. 41 governs the procedure except for
municipal corporations whose charters contain other provisions.4 1t is not clear to what extent the state or its subdivisions would be
subject to restrictions similar to those of art. 1, sec. 13. in the absence of
that explicit provision. The courts of nearly all the states which were
without such a limitation have held that the limitation was merely declara-
tory of certain fundamental principles of natural justice and equity which
were as binding upon the legislature as though expressly incorporated in the
constitution. Later authorities are opposed to this view. In other state,
the right to compensation has been worked out through other constitutional
provisions, such as the due process clause. Consult Lewis, Eminent Domain,
(3rd ed. 1909) sec. 11.
5 Lee v. City of Minneapolis. (1875) 22 Minn. 13: Alden. v. City of
Minneapolis. (1877) 24 Minn. 254: Yanish v. City of St. Paul. (1892) 50
Min. 518. 52 N. W. 925: Willis v. Winona City. (1894) 59'Mmi. 27.
60 N. W. 814. 26 L. R. A. 142. Charters or special laws often provided,
however, for the payment of damages in such cases through an assessment
procedure. See McCarthy v. City of St. Paul. (1876) 22 Minn. 527: Taylor
v. City of St. Paul, (1878) 25 Miln. 129: Wilkin v. City of St. Paul. (1885)
33 Minn. 181. 22 N. W. 249: Abel v. City of Minneapolis, (1897) 68
Minn. 99, 70 N. W. 851.
(Henderson v. City of Minneapolis. (1884) 32 Minn. 319. 20 N. WV.
322: Rakowsky v. City of Duluth. (1890) 44 Minn. 188. 46 N. V. 338:
Abel v. City of Minneapolis, (1897) 68 Minn. 99, 70 N. W. 851.
7Dickerman v. City of Duluth, (1903) 88 Minn. 288. 92 N. V. 1119.
8Sallden v. City of Little Falls. (1907) 102 Minn. 358. 113 N. W. 884:
Wallenberg v. City of Minneanolis. (1910) 111 Minn. 471. 127 N. W. 422,
856: Hirsch v. City of St. Paul. (1912) 117 Minn. 476, 136 N. W. 269.9 Dickerman v. City of Duluth. (1903) 88 Minn. 288. 92 N. V. 1119:
Maguire v. Village of Crosby. (1929) 178 Minn. 144, 226 N. W. 398: Foss
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"for lowering the grade, lateral support rendered necessary
by excavations in the street, injury to a driveway- leading from
the street, and for all other acts which result in substantially
changing conditions to the injury of the property owner.'0
An early case held that any damages from a change of grade
accrued when the change was ordered and that the change is un-
affected by any subsequent conduct either by the lot owner or
the city." This rule was later specifically abrogated by a holding
that the damage accrues when the physical change of grade is
made and not before, since a paper change does no damage.12
The amended constitutional provision has been held to apply
to damages resulting from the vacation of a street." In that case,
the street was not vacated in front of the plaintiff's lot but in
such a way as to make the street in front of his lot a blind alley.
It was held that for such consequential damages, the constitution
did not require the damage to be first ascertained and paid as a
condition precedent to the vacation. The plaintiff is fully protected
because the city is liable in an action for damages in such a case.
In other words, if the property is physically taken, provision for
compensation must be made prior to the taking; but where none
of the property is taken, the right of the owner to go into court
and compel payment for the damage to his property by the in-
vasion of his constitutional right is considered to satisfy the re-
quirement that payment should first be made or secured.
14
Speaking of the amendment to the constitution made in 1896,
the court once said:"
"The purpose of the change is not to change the substantive
law of damages or to enlarge the definition of that term. It was
rather the purpose to make the law of damages uniform so that
a property owner may recover against persons or corporations
having power of eminent domain under the same circumstances
that would have authorized recovery against one not armed with
that power."
To a large extent, as has been pointed out previously, municipali-
ties in their possession of property had already been placed in
v. City of Montevideo, (1929) 178 Minn. 430. 227 N. W. 430; see Sallden
v. City of Little Falls, (1907) 102 Minn. 358, 113 N. W. 884; Austin v.
Village of Tonka Bay, (1915) 130 Minn. 359, 153 N. W. 738.
10Morgan v. City of Albert Lea, (1915) 129 Minn. 59, 151 N. W. 532.
"1'McCarthy v. City of St. Paul, (1876) 22 Minn. 527.
"1-Sather v. City of Duluth, (1913) 123 Minn. 300, 143 N. W. 906.
"Vanderburgh v. City of Minneapolis. (1906) 98 Minn. 329, 103 Minn.
515-, 108 N. W. 480, 6 L. R. A. (N.S.) 741.
14Austin v. Village of Tonka Bay, (1915) 130 Minn. 359, 153 N. W\r. 738.
"5Stuhl v. G. N. Ry. Co., (1917) 136 Minn. 158, 161, 161 N. W. 501.
L. R. A. 1917D 317.
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the same category as private possessors in their subjection to
responsibility for tortious acts against abutting owners; and the
cases since the amendment, particularly those dealing with street
grading and vacation, have bridged the remaining gap between
municipalities and other possessors of land in this respect. They
are liable for removing the lateral support of abutting land,' "
and for gathering surface waters in artificial channels and casting
them on private land;1" and, in general, towns and counties have
also been held liable in damages to property owners when tile
owners' property rights are invaded. 18 Long before the constitu-
tional amendment of 1896, this exception to the usual immunity
of towns and counties was laid to the constitutional prohibition
against the taking of private property for public use without
compensation ;19 and the court has recently reiterated the explana-
tion that "this exception is designed, and necessarily so, to pro-
tect the owner against illegal exercise of the power of eminent
domain."20 This may be a satisfactory explanation of the cases
cited by the court as establishing the principle; but it is not
so easy to justify the extension of the rule to such wrongful acts
as the negligent spreading of quack grass from a highway to
private property21 and especially the negligent spreading of fire
while burning brush on a highvay.22 Negligence is not a taking
16 Dyer v. City of St. Paul, (1881) 27 Minn. 457, 8 N. V. 272; Nichols
v. City of Duluth, (1889) 40 Minn. 389, 42 N. W. 84, 12 Am. St. Rep. 743:
Munger v. City of St. Paul, (1894) 57 Minn. 9, 58 N. W. 601 : "In the con-
trol and improvement of its thoroughfares for public use the city has the
same rights and powers as a private owner has over his own land, and is
subject to the same liabilities. It would be liable for damages caused to
plaintiff's property by grading the avenue and street, just as a private
owner of the soil over which they were laid would have been liable when
improving it for his own use; and the right to inflict damage beyond that
which a private owner might have inflicted without liability did not exist.
The city was authorized to grade, but without exercising the right of
eminent domain it was not authorized to encroach upon plaintiff's property
when so doing. It could not excavate to the full width of the street, leaving
or placing the slope thereon upon his lots to their injury and impairment."
See also Armstrong v. City of St. Paul, (1883) 30 Minn. 299, 15 N. NV.
174.
170'Brien v. City of St. Paul, (1878) 25 Minn. 331, 33 Am. Rep. 470:
McClure v. City of Red Wing, (1881) 28 Minn. 186, 9 N. W. 767. See
the discussion of interferences with surface water, (1942) 26 MINN SorA
LAW REVIEW 629-636.
18Peters v. Town of Fergus Falls, (1886) 35 Minn. 549, 29 N. W. 586;
Gunnerus v. Town of Spring Prairie, (1904) 91 Minn. 473, 98 N. W. 340.
974; Lindstrom v. County of Ramsey, (1917) 136 Minn. 46, 161 N. W. 222:
Kiefer v. County of Ramsey, (1918) 140 Minn. 143, 167 N. W. 362.
19Peters v. Town of Fergus Falls, (1886) 35 Minn. 549, 29 N. W. 586.20Westerson v. State, (1940) 207 Minn. 412, 291 N. W. 900.2 1Dynes v. Town of Kilkenny, (1922) 153 Minn. 11, 189 N. W. 439.
22Newman v. County of St. Louis. (1920) 145 Minn. 129, 176 N. \V. 191.
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or damaging of property for public use within the meaning of
the constitutional provision."3
To state this is not to quarrel with the case of Nerwman v.
County of St. Louis or decisions following it; it suggests, how-
ever, that the explanation of this whole line of cases may not
be bound up so much with a constitutional guaranty as with a
keen realization in cases of injury to property of the inade-
quacies of the traditional immunity doctrine. The decision of
Newman v. County of St. Louis indicates that a basic provision
forbidding the taking or damaging of property without compensa-
tion is not the sine qua non of recovery for tortious property
damage; and the virtual absence of a remedy when the tortious
taker is the state-4 demonstrates that the constitutional guaranty
alone is not sufficient to afford relief to the injured party.
The owners of land abutting streets are considered the fee
owners of the street, subject only to the easement of the public
for traVel.2 Consequently interferences in the street with the
rights of the owner may constitute an unlawful taking of his
property within the meaning of the constitutional provision; but
these cases, as contrasted with those mentioned in the previous
paragraph, have made no mention of art. 1, sec. 13 of the state
constitution as impelling the decisions. There would appear to be
as much reasbn for doing so as in the cases just discussed, but
the court has preferred to rest its decision in each instance upon
common law" principles which apparently would be applicable had
a bill of rights never been included in the constitution.
It has been held, for example, that the soil and mineral in the
street belong to the owner of the fee and that the municipal cor-
poration may remove only so much as is necessary to bring the
street to-grade, probably using such material in the improvement
of other parts of the street; but the public easement justifies only
the taking of material which the process of the construction or
repair of the street requires.2 6 Recovery has been allowed, there-
23Miller v. City of Palo Alto, (1929) 208 Cal. 74, 280 Pac. 108; Clark
v. City of Seattle, (1918) 102 Wash. 228, 172 Pac. 1155; Hamilton v. City
of Bismaick, (N.D. 1941) 300 N. XV. 631; 1 Street, Foundations of Legal
Liability (1906) 222.24See State by Benson v. Erickson, (1931) 185 .finn. 60. 239 N. W\.
908; State 'by Benson v. Stanley, (1933) 188 Ifinn. 390. 247 N. \N. 509,
25Rich -. City of Minneapolis, (1887) 37 Minn. 423. 35 N. XV. 2. 5
Am. St. Rep. 861; Pederson v. City of Rushford, (1920) 146 Minn. 133. 177
N. W. 943; Kelty v. City of 'Minneapolis, (1923) 157 .Minn..430. 196
N. W. 487.
26Rich v. City of Minneapolis, (1887) 37 Minn. 423, 35 N. V. 2.
5 Am. St Rep. 861; Viliski v. City of Minneapolis, (1889) 40 .Minn. 304.
41 N. W. 1054, 3 L. R. A. 831.
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fore, for the value of the stone or other minerals removed when
not required for street improvement.2T
Other action by municipal authorities has likewise been treated
as an unlawful interference with the ownership of the fee. In
West v. Village of White Bear,'2 the owner of the fee was held
entitled to enjoin the village authorities from cutting down trees
outside the traveled portion of a road but within the platted por-
tion when it would serve no useful purpose.
The same principle was applied in Pederson v. City of Rush-
ford,29 where the city had removed a woodshed and cut down and
converted a tree belonging to the plaintiff but encroaching on an
alley not used for general travel. Since the woodshed and tree
did not interfere with any present or proposed use of the alley,
judgment was given for the plaintiff, following West v. Village of
White Bear.
In Johnson v. Village of Gibbon, 3° a landowner was awarded
damages when the village council, proceeding against the plain-
tiff alone, tore out and destroyed a curb which the plaintiff had
installed without encroachment on the traveled way. The au-
thority of the village to take this action if done properly was
conceded, but the court felt that when the council did it because
it was considered a "duty to make him take it out in order to
show him the village council had jurisdiction over the streets," its
arbitrary action entitled the jury to find for the plaintiff. The
principle of the case is somewhat obscure, but it is clear that
according to the decision the village is to be held accountable for
its arbitrary and capricious action even though the action would
be perfectly lawful if the village's authority had been properly
exercised.
P. PROPOSALS FOR FUTURE LEGISLATIVE ACTION
Perhaps the suggestions that conclude this study may be
better understood and appraised in the light of a brief summary
picture of the Minnesota situation with respect to governmental
responsibility for torts. The state's immunity has as yet pre-
vented any substantial modification of its complete irresponsi-
bility for the torts of its officers and agents; aside from payment
of a few claims through legislative channels, only in the last few
27Ibid.
28(1909) 107 Minn. 237, 119 N. W. 1064.
29(1920) 146 Minn. 133, 177 N. W. 943.
.0(1927) 170 Minn. 12, 212 N. W. 15.
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years has there been any subjection of the state to judicial
processes in determining its responsibility in tort, a development
which as yet has been far too limited to reflect a trend. Counties,
towns, and school districts, while traditionally acting as the
state's agents in carrying on their activities, have recently been
placed, with one exception, in the same category as true munici-
pal corporations with respect to tort liability. Like cities and vil-
lages, these "quasi municipal corporations have been held account-
able for the tortious performance of what the court has classified
as proprietary functions while sharing the immunity of the
state in their discharge of governmental functions. The one ex-
ception, the maintenance of streets, where cities and villages
have been held inexplicably liable while counties and towns have
not, occasions more damage suits than almost all other functions
combined. The application of the traditional distinction between
governmental and proprietary functions has sometimes been dif-
ficult, as it has in other states, but the classification thus far
adopted in Minnesota has been fairly orthodox. Of the borderline
functions, hospitals have been placed somewhat conditionally in
the proprietary group, parks in the governmental class; the rest
of 'Minnesota's classification has fit into the traditional pattern.
Yet the governmental-proprietary test of liability has not been
universally applied. The court has repeatedly held it of no signifi-
cance in the case of tortious invasions of interests in real prop-
erty. This has assertedly been due to the constitutional inhibition
against taking private property for public use without compensa-
tion, but it may be due to a more solicitous regard for rights in
property in such cases, a regard which is merely reflected in the
constitutional provision.
Statutes have made but slight inroads on governmental tort
liability in this state. The most important legislation has attempted
to safeguard municipal corporations against fraudulent claims and
unnecessary law suits by requiring a notice of claim as a condition
precedent to suit in case of a tortious injury due to the negligence
of their servants or the defective condition of public property.
The extension of liability by legislation has been slow in coming;
the only important step thus far taken has been the adoption of
legislation permitting governmental units in effect to underwrite the
tort liability of their officers and employees through the carrying
of liability insurance for them. Common law principles of tort
liability have been unaffected by such legislation or in any material
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degree by any other laws; they remain virtually as adopted by
the court in the light of the constitution.
From this survey, the conclusion seems almost inescapable
that the present state of the public law of torts in Minnesota, as in
most other states, cannot be defended in principle; and in the re-
sults it achieves in its failure to impose upon governments com-
plete responsibility for tortious injuries inflicted upon innocent
persons it can only be regarded as reflecting "defective social
engineering. ' 1  The recent statutes permitting some indirect as-
sumption of responsibility have manifested a legislative recogni-
tion of the injustices inherent in the immunity doctrine; but as
yet no statute of any appreciable application has whittled away
any of the immunity which the state and its political subdivisions
have enjoyed ever since the state was organized.
And if there is to be any substantial extension of govern-
mental responsibility, it is clear-so far as future judicial inter-
pretation can be predicted from the past performance of the courts
-that it must come by legislation. As new functions are under-
taken by government, the court will probably strive, wherever it
can do so without doing violence to accepted principles, to place
those functions in the category in which liability is imposed for
tortious acts and omissions; but it is extremely unlikely that, in
the case of established functions, the court will make any appreci-
able change in the rule of liability. It has itself said, "If it is a
better policy to spread the loss to the individual over the taxing
district, if this is thought to be promotive of social justice, as
some think, the legislature can bring the result by statute." 32
What form that legislation should take is conjectural. Theo-
retically, it should completely abrogate the immunity doctrine by
throwing open the courts to claimants against the state and its
political subdivisions on exactly the same basis as if the claims
were against private persons. Practically this may be going much
too far. Just how much too far cannot be evident except after
some such study of the practical administration of tort claims in
Minnesota as has been made in a few cities elsewhere;3' and
3lBorchard. Governmental Responsibility in Tort-A Proposed Statu-
tory Reform, (1925) 11 A. B. A. Jour. 495. 500. He attributes the phrase
elsewhere to Roscoe Pound. The term appears also in Harper. Torts (1933)
sec. 155 and has now come into rather common usage among legal scholars.
32Justice Dibell in Bang v. Independent School District No. 27, St.
Louis County, (1929) 177 Minn. 454, 235 N. W. 449.
33Studies have been completed in Los Angeles, Chicago. Boston, Austin,
Texas, and Medford, Massachusetts, under the sponsorship of the Counittec
on Public Administration of the Social Science Research Council with the
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without the benefit of information that such a study would reveal,
any proposals for statutory reform may be too academic to be of
value.
The keen and profound analysis of the law by Professor
Borchard in his series of articles3 4 demonstrates convincingly that
sovereign immunity and the governmental-proprietary bifurcation
of functions cannot be explained satisfactorily on principle, but
little has yet been- done, aside from the few studies mentioned,
to show what financial burdens would be assumed by the state
and its municipalities were these doctrines to be abrogated by
legislation. One serious accident could cost a small village far
more than the total of its annual budget. This might be an almost
impossible burden unless the risk could be spread by insurance
or assumed in part or in whole by the state. Professor Borchard
in his draft act" suggests that the small municipality might be
obliged to contribute a portion of its tax revenues 30 to a state
fund, the state assuming any excess of liability over the amount
contributed. This can be justified by the fact that in many cases
the municipality is performing state functions. As an incentive
to efficient government, a local community which does not exhaust
its two per cent liability contribution in any one year might be
given credit for the unexpended portion in the next year and
returns might be made of excess amounts paid in at regular
periods.3
7
cooperation of the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers. the
American Municipal Association, and a committee of the Municipal Law
section of the American Bar Association. These studies have been used
as the basis for a recent article by Fuller and Casner, Municipal Tort
Liability in Operation, (1941) 54 Harv. L. Rev. 437. The Los Angeles
study has been published by the Committee on Public Administration of
the Social Science Research Council. David & Feldmeier. (1939) The Ad-
ministration of Public Tort Liability in Los Angeles, 1934-1938. The
Boston study has appeared as Report No. 4 of the Bureau for Research in
Mfunicipal Government, Harvard Graduate School of Public Administration.
Fuller, Tort Liability of Municipalities in Massachusetts with special refer-
ence to its administration in Boston, 1934-1938. See Ascher. Studies in
Municipal Tort Liability, (1940) 5 Legal Notes on Local Government 352.
A recent work has included a survey of municipal tort administration in
Virginia. Warp, Municipal Tort Liability in Virginia, (1942) 63-82.
34Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, (1924) 34 Yale L. J. 1-45;
129-143; Governmental Responsibility in Tort, (1926-27) 36 Yale L. J., 1-41.
757-807, 1039-1100; Governmental Responsibility in Tort, (1928) 28 Col
L. Rev. 577-617; Theories of Governmental Responsibility in Tort, (1928)
28 Col. L. Rev. 734-775.35Borchard, State and Municipal Liability in Tort, (1934) 20 A. B. A. J.
747. 36He suggests two per cent.
37Borchard, State and Municipal Liability in Tort, (1934) 20 A. B. A. J.
876 .lINNESOTA LAW REV1EIf'
If existing experience were known, it might already have
demonstrated the necessity for other safeguards in any legis-
lation imposing tort liability on the state and its subdivisions.
Little attempt at fraud was found in Los Angeles, Boston and
the other cities studied, and the total amount paid in tort claims
under conditions of partial legal immunity did not show that
it would be impracticable to have restricted immunity there still
further.s However, municipal officials generally have been some-
what apprehensive of the additional expenditures from public
funds which an extension of liability would necessitate.? The
danger of fraud and of excessive claims can be minimized by the
inclusion of a provision for maximum liability or, perhaps better
still, by the adoption of a schedule of payments for various kinds
of injuries somewhat comparable to the schedule found in the
workmen's compensation act.
40
With motor vehicle claims a possible exception, the greatest
number of tort claims would arise under any law in a field in
which responsibility is already complete so far as municipal cor-
porations are concerned. As a practical matter, this liability for
street and sidewalk defects may be already too extensive in cities
and villages at the present time if the various provisions included
in home rule charters to limit liability are any criterion. A study
of the cases inclines one toward the view that there is a tendency
38Fuller and Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, (1941) 54
Harv. L. Rev. 437, 450. 460. The total payments for claims settled adminis-
tratively in Los Angeles during 1935-1938 averaged $7,578.25 annually and
the average individual payment during the same period was $94.73: pay-
ments during 1933-1939 in Austin averaged $597.26 annually or $87.09 tcr
recovery: in Chicago, total payments averaged $3,944 annually during
1937-1938 and the average individual payment was $59.31 : in Medford. nay-
ments of the city averaged $1.709.67 between 1934 and 1939 with an aver-
age individual recovery of $179.76. Fuller and Casner. op. cit. 449. As
those authors point out. "A single area of municioial tort liability opens the
door to the would-be defrauder in quite the same way as would a doctrine
of complete liability." Idem, 450.
39 Among the law review articles discussing liability, those written by
officials have been most critical of the extension of liability. See. for
example, Webber. Municipal Tort Liability. (1938) 3 Peabody L. Rev. 60:
McCash, Ex Delicto Liability of Counties in Iowa. (1924) 10 Iowa L. B. 16.
Note also the opinions of city attorneys in Virginia in Warp. Municipal Tort
Liability in Virgina. (1942) 83-102. Most of them favored continuance
of the governmental-proprietary distinction.
40 Fuller and Casner have suggested instead that recovery in tort actions
;1gainst a municipal corporation be confined to actual monetary damages,.
Municipal Tort Liability in Operation (1941) 54 Harv. L. Rev. 437-461.
"Practically, the purpose of tort liability would be sufficiently served with
complete municipal liability limited by statute to the recovery of actual
monetary damages. With this limitation, the cost of complete liability would
Plmost certainly be less than municipalities now spend for unlimited liability
in particular areas. Distribution of damages paid would be far more in)
accord with the demands of justice and public policy." Ibid.
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for the courts to advance the position of the municipal corporation
to that of an insurer in such cases, particularly where the defect
complained of is an accumulation of ice or snow. Perhaps this
belief is what prompted the League of Minnesota Municipalities
in 1939 to sponsor legislation to abolish liability resulting from
the defective condition of streets and sidewalks resulting from
wear and tear or climatic conditions. 4 ' A provision exempting
cities and villages in snow and ice cases might be more defensible,
and at least two cities by charter have adopted this rule. The
standard of care required to prevent the kind of accumulations of
ice and snow which now give rise to liability is such a high one
that few, if any, cities and villages can attempt to meet it; the
possible liability is in most cases considered less burdensome than
the expense of removing snow and ice from sidewalks and streets.
Perhaps it ought not to be considered negligence in this climate
to permit the accumulation of hummocks of snow and ice on
streets and sidewalks; but it is, and only a legislative declaration
to the contrary can supplant this standard of care with one which
more nearly accords with reasonableness.
If this is found to be undesirable, a more modest change
might be considered: the allowance of a shorter period within
which to file notice of claims in cases of defective conditions due
to snow and ice.42 Snow and ice conditions are so transitory, even
in a climate such as this, that if a notice requirement is to serve
its purpose, it should be satisfied in time to permit the investigat-
ing authorities to find the street or sidewalk in a condition as
nearly as possible like that which existed at the time of the
accident.
If a study of the administration of tort claims in this state were
to indicate that inflated verdicts against the city or village in
street and sidewalk cases were not unusual, it might be worth
considering a provision like the notice requirement of the Owa-
tonna charter 3 under which the claimant is required to waive
a jury trial unless the city has received a written notice of the
defect at least five days before the injury complained of. The
provision is much less harsh than one which requires actual notice
before the accident in all cases, and if the city is more likely to
receive just treatment at the hands of a court than at the hands
41(1939) 25 Minnesota Municipalities 38. The bills, introduced as H. F.
1163 and S. F. 1068, were never passed out of committee.
42-n Massachusetts the period is limited to ten days in such cases and
thirty days, as in Minnesota, in all other cases. Mass. Gem Laws 1932,
ch. 84, sec. 15.43Owatonna charter (1909) ch. VI, sec. 6.
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of a jury, such a provision may have some merit in preventing
the imposition of liability in excessive amounts.44
Whether municipal liability for street and sidewalk defects is
limited or left as it is, serious consideration should be given by the
legislature to placing towns and counties in exactly the same
category as cities and villages in this respect. The present law in
this respect is indefensible on principle and can be explained only
as a historical accident. The only practical objection to a legisla-
tive abolition of the immunity of towns and counties for their
failure to maintain their roads in safe condition is the financial
burden that might thereby be occasioned; but this is a burden
which has been borne by cities and villages since the state was
organized. The expense would probably be no more intolerable
in one case than in the other.
While proposals like the foregoing can be made only in very
tentative fashion in the absence of some knowledge of the number
and amount of claims that would be affected,45 two suggestions
may be made with less hesitation. One is that the notice require-
ment be extended, as it already has been by a number of charters,
to cover all claims for damages resulting from injuries to persons
or property. If the purpose of the notice requirement is sound.
it applies not only to claims resulting from defects and from negli-
gence but to other damage claims as well. The same need for a
prompt investigation, the same necessity for an opportunity to
settle without suit exists in cases of other torts as in the case of
those now covered by the statute requiring notice.
If this change is made, the statute should also be extended
to towns, counties, and school districts. Even if the scope of
the statute as to the type of claims covered is not broadened, the
amendment of the statute to cover claims against quasi municipal
corporations seems desirable, although the claims to which the
present notice statute would apply in the case of these units are so
few that the change is probably unimportant.
The other proposal is that the present statutes permitting the
insurance of officers against liability and the payment of claims
resulting from motor vehicle torts be extended to all other torts
44The problem of jury trial obviously is too vast and too controversial
to permit more than this brief mention of the point here.
45In addition to studies of municipal tort administration already men-
tioned, some like material is available in connection with claims against
the state of New York under its Court of Claims Act. See Borehard.
Recent Statutory Developments in Municipal Liability in Tort. (1936) 2
Legal Notes on Local Government 89. 99. Claims allowed over the eriod
from 1929 to 1935 approximated fifteen per year and the amount allowed
averaged $82,000 a year. an insignificant amount for New York state.
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whether committed in a governmental or proprietary capacity.4"
Governmental immunity is now a bar to payment of claims which
some municipal councils feel should be discharged as a moral obli-
gation. Furthermore, many "risks" which cannot now be insured
against because, with the municipal corporation not liable, there
is no actual risk, might be considered worthy of insurance protec-
tion to those who are injured through the fault of the munici-
pality. Claims resulting from defects in public buildings are of
this character. It is possible that because of a lack of actuarial
data and other factors, it may not be feasible, at least at the present
time, to secure liability insurance against all torts; but this should
not prevent the enactment of a permissive statute that could be
availed of to whatever extent insurance proved practicable. This
optional legislation has the advantage of imposing no burdens on
municipalities which felt unable or unwilling to assume them; and
if it authorized the compromise or settlement of any claim on
which there might be liability but for the present rules of govern-
mental immunity, it would give municipalities an opportunity
of avoiding the hardship frequently resulting from the present
rules.
The state is so large a unit that it would cost more for it to
insure against claims than for it to pay those claims itself.4? Ex-
perience is showing, however, that the legislature is finding itself
more and more unable to act as the claim adjuster for the state;
and no adequate remedy is likely to be found short of a general
act either setting up a separate court of claims or, preferably,
investing the present courts with the functions of a court of claims.
Such an act presupposes, of course, a waiver of the state's im-
munity from suit.
There is no reason in principle why the same rules should
not apply to municipal liability in tort as in contract; and there
is no more reason why the state should not be held just as ac-
countable as the municipality in both cases. Until this is done, the
injured citizen will not secuie the "remedy for every wrong" to
which he feels entitled under the state constitution. The state's
obligations, moral or legal, that exist but cannot be enforced "are
ghosts that are seen in the law, but that are elusive to the group.""4
(Concluded)
46This assumes, of course, that complete legislative abolition of the
immunity doctrine is not found to be practicable.
47Large municipalities frequently have the same experience. Los Angeles
reported saving a considerable amount by acting as self-insurer in work-
men's compensation cases. David and Feldmeier, The Administration of
Public Tort Liability in Los Angeles 37. Several of the larger cities in
Minnesota have similar records.
48Mr. Justice Holmes in The Western Mfaid, (1922) 257 U. S. 419.
42 Sup. Ct. 159, 66 L. Ed. 299.
